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Plaintiff, an owner of real estate, sought to enjoin the New York
City Tax Commission from granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for properties owned and used exclusively for
religious worship. The exemption from state taxes was authorized by
the New York State Constitution' and implemented by the state's
Real Property Tax Law. 2 Defendant's motion for summary judgment
was granted and the supreme court, appellate division 3 and the court
of appeals, 4 affirmed. The Supreme Court of the United States also
affirmed, 5 holding that the New York statute which exempted from
taxation the real property owned by an association organized exclusively for religious purposes and used exclusively for carrying out such
purposes is not unconstitutional as an attempt to establish, sponsor or
support religion.
In reaching its decision, the Court resolved the issue of whether
or not a tax exemption for property owned and used for religious purposes constituted a governmental subsidy to religion and thereby was
violative of the establishment clause of the first amendment. Rejecting the attack on the tax exemption as such a subsidy, the majority
maintained that the tax exemption provision of the statute was permissible as a minimal involvement between church and state.6 Thus,
the Court redefined the area of contact permitted between church
and state within the confines of the establishment clause and permitted the long established practice of tax exemption to church owned
and church used property to continue.
In defining the scope of the establishment clause, the Court
noted that, to its authors, the term "establishment" meant "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity."7 The Court's acceptance of this definition resolves
the smoldering controversy as to whether the establishment clause
commands "a wall of separation between church and state" or permits the state to assume a neutral position in relations with the
I

N.Y. CONsT. art. 16, § .
2 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420(1) (McKinney 1960).
3 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 30 App. Div. 2d 778, 292 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1968).
4 WaT v. Tax Comm'n, 24 N.Y.2d 30, 246 N.E.2d 517, 298 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1969).

5 WalT v. Tax Cornm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
6 Id.

at 674.

7 Id. at 668.

NOTES
church. Contributing to the heat of the controversy and enhancing
the no-aid position were earlier declarations as to the perimeters of
the establishment clause. For example, in Everson v. Board of Education,8 the Court delimited the ambit of the establishment clause
when it declared:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion ....

No tax in any amount, large or small, can be

levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect "a wall of separation between church and State."9
Among the proscriptions enunciated in Everson are some which
are now clouded by the Walz decision, and which probably prompted
the Walz Court to account for the cloud in the following language:
In attempting to articulate the scope of the two Religion Clauses,
the Court's opinions reflect the limitations inherent in formulating
general principles on a case-by-case basis. The considerable internal
inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives from what, in
retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on aspects of
these clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases
but have limited meaning as general principles.' 0
The "too sweeping utterances" appear to be those first stated
in Everson and reiterated in subsequent establishment clause cases.
In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education," which followed
Everson by one year, the Court quoted the no-aid pronouncement and
emphasized that both the majority and minority opinions in Everson
stated that the establishment clause required "a wall of separation
between the church and State.' '1 2 That wall, McCollum held, was
breached by the use of public school facilities for the private instruc8 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
9 Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
10 397 U.S. at 668.

11 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
12

Id. at 211.
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tion of religion. Again in Torcaso v. Watkins,13 the Court affirmed
both Everson and McCollum, declining to renounce their utterances
as dicta and not authoritative as an interpretation of the scope of the
first amendment's establishment clause. 14 Fourteen years after Everson, the words were again used in McGowan v. Maryland3 where the
Court sustained a Sunday closing law but on the theory that its religious origin had been transcended by the primary secular purpose
of providing a uniform day of rest.
The controversy as to the delineations of the establishment
clause derives essentially from what the opposing views regard as the
historic origin and purpose of the clause. Those arguing that tax
exemptions are permissible view the establishment clause as a safeguard only against the entrenchment of a particular sect by virtue of
'some type of governmental favoritism. 16 Early state constitutions
granting exemptions to churches are cited as indicative of the attitude of the founders and reflect an intended policy of benevolent
neutrality.' 7 That policy does not renounce a relationship between
church and state as long as that relationship does not result in the
establishment of a national religion.' 8 Adherents of this permissibleif-impartial position approach the no-aid doctrine of Everson as a departure from the traditional pattern of church-state relations. 19
Supporting this view is a formidable list of state and lower federal
13 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (belief in God as a prerequisite to public office is unconstitutional).
14 Id. at 493.
15 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
16 See III A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 561 et seq. (1950);
Lasson, Religious Freedom and the Church-State Relations in Maryland, 14 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 4 (1968); V. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1871 (1833); C. ANTIEAu, A. DOWNEY & E. RoBERTs, FREEDoM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT 160, 161 (1964);
Editorial, 8 J. CHURCH & STATE 333 (1966); Brooks, The Functions of the Constitution
and the Establishment Clause, 13 CATHOLIC LAwYER 325 (1967).
17 ANTIEAU, supra note 16, at 159; Lasson, supra note 16.
18 See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), where the Court upheld released time
for out of school religious training. Justice Douglas, dissenter in Walz, wrote the opinion
in Zorach and said:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being. . . . We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no
partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal
of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. . . . To hold that it may not
[encourage religious instruction] would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious
groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those
who do believe.
Id. at 313-14.
19 STOKES, supra note 16, at 564-65; ANTIEAU, supra note 16, at 160.
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court decisions upholding the constitutionality of tax exemptions to
church owned and used property. 20 The underlying hypothesis in
many of these decisions is the benefit accruing to the community as
a whole from the social and moral welfare activities of religious organizations. 21 The rationale here is twofold. First, religious societies,
by performing social welfare services, relieve the state of some of the
burdens it would otherwise have; conversely, taxation of exempt
church property would not materially alter the tax burden as the
funds so raised would be diverted to services formerly provided by
churches. This rationale was rejected by the Walz decision because
it offered too variable a basis by which to measure the exemption and
would in turn, involve church and state in too protracted a relationship. 22 Thus, to determine what aid was going directly to religious
purposes would not comport with the limited contacts permissible.
The second justification for tax exemptions in the past has been
the promotion of morals and ethics which is beneficial to society as
a whole and to the advancement of civilization.2 3 This argument was
advanced to sustain the constitutionality of school prayer, but in
School District of Abington Township v. Schernpp,24 the Court rejected this contention, declaring that moral inspiration, when promoted by religiously oriented Bible reading, violated the establishment
clause. However, the Walz Court took a different view, recognizing
the "moral . . . improvement" afforded the community by "certain
entities" without distinguishing between the social services and the
purely religious practices of organized religion as the Schempp Court
20 Swallow v. United States, 325 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 950
(1963); Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385, 400 (C.C. Cal. 1883), aff'd, 118 U.S.
394 (1886); Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Casados, 21 F. Supp. 989 (D.NM.), aff'd, 305
U.S. 558 (1938); State v. Alabama Educ. Found., 231 Ala. 11, 163 So. 527 (1935); Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1, appeal dismissed sub nom.
Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956); Fellowship of Humanity v. County
of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); San Francisco v.
McGovern, 28 Cal. App. 491, 152 P. 980 (Dist. Ct. App. 1915); Garrett Biblical Inst. v.
Elmhurst State Bank, 331 Ill. 308, 163 N.E. 1 (1928); Murray v. Comptroller of Treas.,
241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966); General Finance Corp. v.
Archetto, 93 R.I. 392, 176 A.2d 73 (1961), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 423 (1962).
21 Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Washington Ethical Soc. v. District of
Columbia. 249 F.2d 127, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1957); City of Hanibal v. Draper, 15 Mo. 425,
428 (1852); Y.M.C.A. v. Douglas County, 60 Neb. 642, 646, 83 N.W. 924, 927 (1900).
22 397 U.S. at 674.
23 E.g., Orr v. Baker, 4 Ind. 86, 88 (1853), where the court said:
It is easier to admire the motives for such exemption than to justify it by any
sound argument. . . . To say that such is the practice of civilized nations, is
not sound. It is rather an apology for a departure from principle.
24 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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had distinguished the Bible as literature from the Bible as a religious
25
instrumentality.
It thus appears that neither of the major hypotheses supporting
the exemption in its two centuries of existence is left wholly intact.
The social welfare thesis is rejected by the Court itself; the moral
betterment rationale is retrieved from a prior rejection. What now
stands as the parameter of tax exemption is a policy of briefest of
involvements; "[t]he exemption creates only a minimal and remote
involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of
churches. '26 On this point the Court, quoting Madison, had previously said:
"[I]t is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. . . Who does not see that the same authority which can
establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians ....- 27
Opponents of the tax exemption contend that historically, the
first amendment's establishment clause dictates a wall of separation
between church and state which is breached by state action that aids
religious organizations regardless of the scrupulous impartiality with
which that aid is given.2 In support of this position are a series of
Supreme Court decisions which indicate that neutrality, defined as
assistance without discrimination as to sect, would not redeem the
constitutionality of state acts in aid of religion. In Schempp, the
Court said of the permissible-if-impartial distinction being urged:
[T]his Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the
Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one
religion over another ...
Such contentions, in the light of the consistent interpretation in cases of this Court, seem entirely untenable and of value
29
only as academic exercises.
Madison, termed by the Court as the framer of the first amendment, 0 regarded tax exemptions to religious bodies for property so
used to be an encroachment upon the constitutional mandate for
25
26
27
28
29

Compare 374 U.S. at 224 with 397 U.S. at 671-72.
397 US. at 676.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962).
L. PFEFFER, CHuacn, STATE AND FREEDoM 149, 154 (rev. ed. 1967).

374 U.S. at 216-17. See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), where the Court
held that the mere nondenominational aspect of school prayer would not save it from
conflict with the first amendment.
80 Flast v. Cohen, 392 US. 83, 103 (1968); 397 U.S. at 705 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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separation between government and religion."' Inherent in Madi,
son's perspective of the establishment clause is a recognition of the
rights of nonbelievers and their protection under this clause. As
quoted by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Walz, Madison
wrote:
"Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine
origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds
have not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us." 2
In other decisions the Court has recognized the distinction between believers and nonbelievers, and has not permitted preferential
33
treatment of one group over another. In United States v. Seeger,
the Court accepted as equal, religious doctrines disavowing a belief
in the existence of God. Although the Seeger opinion does not derogate a religious test altogether, its acceptance of disbelief in God as
grounds for a draft deferment was a step toward equalizing the positions of believers and nonbelievers. The relevance of this to Walz
is indicated by another case decided at the same time. In Welsh v.
United States,34 the Court accorded conscientious objector status to
a claimant who denied that his views were religious. Justice Harlan,
concurring, referred to his own concurring opinion in Walz and added:
The constitutional question that must be faced in this case
is whether a statute that defers to the individual's conscience only
when his views emanate from adherence to theistic religious beliefs
is within the power of Congress. . . . However, having chosen to
exempt, it cannot draw the line between theistic or nontheistic
religious beliefs on the one hand and secular beliefs on the other.
Any such distinctions are not, in my view, compatible with the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.3 5
In Torcaso v. Watkins, the Court struck down a religious test oath
as violative of the free exercise clause because a state could not "aid
all religions as against non-believers." 3 6 Yet this aspect is not considered by the majority in Walz. On the contrary, the Court averred
a position which overlooked the distinctions wrought by Seeger and
Torcaso and reaffirmed in Welsh. To Justice Douglas, however, the
31

397 U.S. at 713;

PFEFFER,

397 U.S. at 705.
33 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
34 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
35 Id. at 356.
36 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
32

supra note 28, at 215.
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issue presented by Walz was the exemption afforded believers merely
because they are believers. In his dissenting opinion, Douglas viewed
the issue here as governed by the principles established in Torcaso,
which enunciated a position of government neutrality between be37
lievers and nonbelievers.
An analysis of what governmental actions have been held to be
within the establishment clause indicates the test the Court has devised by which to gauge acceptable conduct. For example, in Everson,
the Court stated that the wall of separation was not breached by
transporting parochial school students at public expense, as this in
no way fostered or inhibited religion.38 The Court discarded the
argument that once transported to school, pupils in parochial schools
would be receiving religious instruction which would be an aid to
religion. The Court instead focused on the primary public purpose
of the state policy in providing public transportation of students.
The public purpose-safe transportation of children to schoolprovided the overriding consideration and, aid to religion, if any,
was merely incidental. It was children, not religion, who were being
aided.3 9 In Board of Education v. Allen, 40 supplying books to parochial school students was also regarded not as an aid to religion but
rather as an aid to the education of children. Again, the primary
purpose test negated what was urged to be state action in aid of religion. This primary purpose standard as determinative of permissible state action under the establishment clause was again enunciated
in Schempp:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the
primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or
inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the 41
scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.
Thus, pre-Walz precedent distinguished between state action in
aid of education and children, and religion. But in Walz, there were
no dominant public purposes to distract from the aid-to-religion
contention of the plaintiff; arguments of incidental benefit accruing
to secular groups for primary public-purposed legislation were not
applicable. Thus the Walz Court directly confronted the issue of
37

397 U.S. at 700-01.

38 330 US. at 17.

89 Id. at 18.
40 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
41 374 US. at 222 (1963); see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 US. 599 (1961).
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which government acts in aid of religion are permissible; consequently, Walz, more so than other first amendment cases, sets
forth the criteria. Rejected is the wall of separation and in its place
is a screened fence through which impartial aid may be funnelled,
provided, however, that such aid is not directly given. 42 This distinction between a direct subsidy and indirect aid in the form of a tax
exemption causes some inconsistency with prior "sweeping utterances." For example, in Flast v. Cohen, 43 the Court noted that it was
"palpably unconstitutional conduct" for government to provide funds
for the construction of churches. But in Walz it is not unconstitutional to exempt church property from taxation. However, if the
primary purpose test of Schempp were applied, the distinction between direct and indirect aid would be dim. No factors of incidental secular benefits are present to sustain a tax exemption for church
property when framed in a primary public purpose test. Despite this,
the Walz Court was able to discern, in the purpose of the exemption,
a legislative intent not to advance religion but rather to prevent the
inhibition of "certain entities that exist in a harmonious relation44
ship to the community at large" and which serve the public interest.
By this reasoning, the Court met the Schempp test.
An essential element of the Walz decision is the fact that exemptions minimize the relations between church and state and preclude
the state from any interference with the churches. Illustrative of this
principle is the Court's discussion of the hazards which would be
presented by taxation of church property.4 5 Taxation, by implication,
carries the power to penalize for failure to pay the tax, thus conferring upon the states the power to confiscate church property. Exemptions, on the other hand, avert this hazard and thereby avoid a
potential conflict with the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 46 Thus, while the Court ostensibly deals only with the issue of
exempting church property, has the underlying reasoning palpably
foreclosed legislative action to remove the exemption? The question
is currently relevant as many legislatures, faced with mounting needs
for funds and a diminished tax base, seek to expand the sources of tax
397 U.S. at 675; see also 397 U.S. at 690 (Brennan, J., concurring).
392 U.S. 83, 98 n.17 (1968); see also Horace Mann League v. Board of Pub. Works,
242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 97 (1966); Kauper, Constitutionality of
Tax Exemptions for Religious Activities, in D. OAKS, THE WALL BETwEEN CHURCH AND
STATE (1963).
44 397 U.S. at 672.
45 Id. at 674.
48 Id. at 676.
42
43
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revenues. 47 Various studies are under way to consider the potential
48
income which could be derived from taxing religious property. If
the reasoning of Walz were to apply, and the minimal contact test there
devised were to govern, taxation of religious-owned and used property might be precluded. However, there is authority to the contrary
which appears to have anticipated this question. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania,49 the Court passed on the validity of a license tax on religious
colporteurs and rejected it as a violation of the free exercise clause.
As was there stated:
We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press
are free from all financial burdens of government. . . .We have
here something quite different, for example, from a tax on the
income of one who engages in religious activities or a tax on
property used or employed in connection with those activities.
It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a
preacher.It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the
privilege of delivering a sermon.... Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as
to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those
who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary
evangelism can close its doors to all those who do not have a full
purse. 50
From this it is apparent that taxation of religious property is to be
distinguished from taxation of religion itself; just as the transportation of children to religious schools is to be distinguished from aid to
religion.
Another line of reasoning also supports taxation of religious
property. Analogous to taxation of religious property is taxation of
other first amendment instrumentalities. Justice Douglas' dissenting
opinion takes note of this:
Churches, like newspapers also enjoying First Amendment
rights, have no constitutional immunity from all taxes. As we
said in Murdock:
"We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press
51
are free from all financial burdens of government."
Thus, a valid distinction is made between the freedom from
taxation of worship, press or speech and the state's power to tax en47 M.
MUNITIES:

LARSON
AN
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65-68 (1969).

48 Id.

319 U.S. 105 (1943).
50 Id. at 112 (emphasis added).
51 397 U.S. at 707. See also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 US. 233 (1936).
49
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tities giving expression to these first amendment freedoms. This distinction overshadows the minimal contacts thesis evolved by Walz.
There the Court sought to thwart the potential conflict that lurks
somewhere in the penumbra between the religious clauses of the
first amendment. To accommodate these two clauses, Walz proffered
minimal contacts. It is apparent however, that this thesis will not
survive as a test that could be consistently applied. The weakness of
the test underscores the dilemma faced by the Court. The resolution
of the issue presented by Walz appears ultimately to rest on a ground
alternately disclaimed and embraced by the Court: The "two centuries of uninterrupted freedom from taxation. ' '52 In disclaiming this
basis for permitting the exemption the Court states that ubiquity and
long practice do not make for constitutionality.5 3 However, the tenor
of the majority opinion indicates that this consideration was ultimately more persuasive than other factors.
Lorraine S. Gerson
52

397 U.S. at 678.

53 Id.

